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"AT-RISK" REVISITED: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
ON THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
The Tax Reform Act of 19761 dramatically changed the approach
to investments in five types of high-risk ventures. 2 Prior to the Act,
investments in oil and gas drilling, farm operations, equipment leasing,
and motion pictures had benefited from favorable tax incentives. Con-
gress responded to the alleged abuse of these tax shelters3 by enacting
the "at-risk" provisions of section 465 of the Internal Revenue Code.4
The at-risk rules limit the deduction of losses incurred in these activi-
ties to the amount the taxpayer has at-risk5 and apply to all taxpayers,
except corporations which are not personal holding companies or Sub-
chapter S corporations.6
One of the areas of abuse specifically named in the Act was the
activity of "holding, producing, or distributing motion picture films
... Before 1976 such tax-oriented investments typically used a
limited partnership in the investment vehicle.8 These partnerships9
1. PUB. L. No. 94-455, 90 STAT. 1520 (1976), (hereinafter cited as the "Act").
2. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1982). The scope of the at-risk rules was ex-
panded in 1978 to include all activities "Engaged in by the taxpayer in carrying on a trade or
business or for the production of income."
3. Sheltering of income involves the "creation of investments" which produce immedi-
ate deductions "of the appropriate character and of sufficient magnitude to reduce or elimi-
nate otherwise taxable income." Packman, Tax Shelters: A Non-Dilettante's View, 53 TAXES
279 (1975).
4. Committee reports make it clear that the changes were motivated by the wide use of
tax shelter limited partnerships which led Congress to believe that taxpayers abused some of
the partnership provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975), reprintedin
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) reprinted
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3475.
5. A taxpayer is at-risk with respect to money and the adjusted basis of property he has
contributed to the activity. I.R.C. § 465(b) (West 1978). He is also at-risk on money bor-
rowed with respect to an activity if he is personally liable for repayment or if he has pledged
property as security for the loan. The pledged property can neither be used in the activity
nor financed through a loan secured by other property which the taxpayer has contributed to
the activity. § 465, supra.
6. I.R.C. § 465(a) (West Supp. 1982).
7. I.R.C. § 465(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
8. For an extensive discussion of the effects of the Act upon partnerships, see Com-
ment, New Restrictions on Tax Shelter Limited Partnerships, 56 NEB. L. REV. 300 (1977). See
also Weiler, The 1At Risk' Iules: A New Considerationfor Tax Shelter Investments and Part-
nerships, 36 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 1351 (1978).
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were designed to produce substantial tax benefits through the use of
methods to reduce tax liability, such as tax deferral and nonrecourse
leveraging. The at-risk provisions substantially limit the use of these
methods by individuals and small corporations, thus precluding the
pass-through of tax losses to individuals.
Prior to the Act some imprudent investors undoubtedly became
involved in partnerships which were economically dubious merely to
obtain tax losses.'" While they correctly eliminate "shady" ventures,
the at-risk rules, however, also eliminate some sound business transac-
tions. This article proposes an alternative approach, using tools al-
ready available to the Internal Revenue Service. This approach
provides the flexibility needed by film investors in order to promote the
artistic diversity now lacking in Hollywood.
Part I explores the methods used to finance motion pictures prior
to the Act. The at-risk rules are then examined in Part II. The alter-
nate approach proposed is developed in Part III, using case law arising
before at-risk times.
PART I: MODES OF TRADITIONAL MOTION PICTURE FINANCING
The primary financing arrangement used by motion picture inves-
tors to shelter income before the Act was the "negative pick-up transac-
tion."" The investors, through a limited partnership, purchased a
finished film from the producer under the negative pick-up. 12 The ar-
rangement normally provided for a down payment with the remaining
balance due at a future time, which time depended upon income from
the distribution of the motion picture. The investors had no personal
9. The effect of the Act on such partnerships in other activities has also gained exten-
sive treatment in legal periodicals. See Dickenson and Sutton, The Effect of the 1976 Tax
Reform Act on the Ownership of Professional Sports Franchises, I COMM/ENT 227 (1977).
10. In fact the Treasury Department did not identify motion pictures as an area of tax
shelter abuse in 1973 when it presented its tax shelter proposals to the House Committee on
Ways and Means. See Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 18, at 6996-7006 (1973) (Statement of Secretary
of the Treasury George P. Schultz). Motion picture tax shelters became an increasingly
popular device, however, and the resulting publicity assured that they would be brought to
the attention of Congress. See, e.g., How to Invest in Movies, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 25,
1975, at 73-75, 79-80.
11. See Comment, Motion Picture Tax Shelters: Are the Funds At Risk?, 28 AM. U.L.
REV. 177, 178-180 (1979). See generally, Blanc and Williams, The Impact of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 on Independent Film Production, 1 REV. TAX. IND. 314 (1977), and Kanter and
Eisenberg, What Alice Sees Through the Looking Glass When Movieland Seeks Creative Fi-
nancing, 53 TAXES 94 (1975).
12. See generally, Appel, The Motion Picture Service Company:. A Service to the Motion
Picture Industry, 27 U.S. CAL. INST. FED. TAX 559 (1975).
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liability for the balance of the fixed purchase price and the only secur-
ity for payment was income from the film. 3
Under this type of arrangement, purchasing a film involved a
smaller risk of capital than financing the initial production, although
the total purchase price could be higher than the production cost. In
this way, the investor minimized his potential loss should the film fail
to recover its production costs. On the other side, if the film attained
box office success, the extra cost of purchasing as opposed to direct
financing could be neglible in relation to the potential profits. The
purchase of a film using this financing structure provided an investor
with the opportunity to gain while it minimized his downside risk of
loss.
The investor could also claim the investment tax credit on his basis
in the film. 4 From the Internal Revenue Services' perspective, many
investors in negative pick-up transactions claimed excessive deprecia-
tion deductions by overstating the fair market value of the film'5 and
by understating the total estimated income from the film. 16 The Serv-
ice announced in 1977 that the investors' bases in a partnership en-
gaged in a negative pick-up transaction could not include nonrecourse
indebtedness where "the fair market value of the film (does not) at least
approximate the amount of the nonrecourse note."'
17
If the purchased film performed poorly at the box office and there
was negligible or no net distribution income, the investment was shel-
tered since the depreciation was deductible and was in excess of the
actual cash invested in the film.'" The investor had an opportunity to
13. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
94th Cong., Ist Sess., Tax Shelters. Motive Films, 1-6 (Comm. Print 1975).
14. Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. U.S. 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 415 U.S. 934
(1974) (Motion picture negatives held tangible personal property eligible for the investment
tax credit).
15. CCH Internal Revenue Service Tax Shelter Training Manual, § 5.0-5.0125 (Special
No. 19) (April 14, 1976).
16. The negative pick-up transaction generated large initial tax losses only where the
inconsistent position was taken that the fair market value of the film greatly exceeded the
total estimated revenues from the film.
17. Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
18. The accepted method of depreciating films is the "income forecast method." This
technique was developed when it was recognized that the usual methods of depreciation
(such as straight line or declining balance) creates distortions of income in the case of films.
This distortion occurs because 80 to 90 percent of the total revenue from theatrical distribu-
tion is normally earned within the first twelve months of distribution. If the straight line
method for example, were used over five years, the amount expensed during the first year
would be smaller than it should be and in subsequent years the amount expensed would not
19821
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recoup all or a part of his actual investment by investing that tax sav-
ings attributable to the rapid depreciation. 9 Assuming the film was
eventually foreclosed, the investor reported depreciation recapture in-
come in the amount that the unrecovered cost was less than the mort-
gage balance.2° The amount initially deductible changed dramatically
with the passage of the Act.
PART II: WHAT CONSTITUTES THE AT-RISK AMOUNT
The at-risk provisions now focus on all activities, "Engaged in by
the taxpayer in carrying on a trade or business or for the production of
income."21 Under the provision, all taxpayers, with the exception of
large corporations,22 can no longer deduct losses in certain specified
activities for a given year in excess of the amount such taxpayers have
at-risk in that investment in such year.23 Therefore, those investing in
tax shelters subject to this limitation may no longer take advantage of
be offset by a proportionate amount of income. The matching principle of accounting would
not be met.
The "income-forecast method" of computing depreciation was approved for films by
the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as "The Service") in Rev. Ruls. 60-358
and 63-273 to prevent these inequities and distortions of income. Under this method, the
owner of a film is allowed to depreciate its cost (less a reasonable salvage value) over the
period during which the film is expected to produce income, in proportion to the projected
realization of receipts for each year of the period. This method provides a better matching
of income and expenses and decreases any distortion which would be caused by the other
depreciation methods. See generally Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68; Rev. Rul. 64-273,
1964-2 C.B. 62. See also Wildman v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. No. 67 (1982).
19. The investor must demonstrate that the purchase price of the film appeared feasible
under the circumstances and that proper promotion of the film was reasonably expected
based on a distribution agreement with a reputable distributor. If this is shown, he could be
entitled to a depreciation deduction computed on the full purchase price at the time, even if
the picture did not perform according to his initial projections.
20. An example of this kind of transaction would be as follows: An investor purchases a
film for $2,000,000.00, paying 20% down. After he has deducted depreciation of
$1,500,000.00 the film is foreclosed, at which time the unpaid balance of the mortgage note is
$1,200,000.00. The gain on foreclosure would be $700,000.00, as illustrated below:
CASH $ 400,000.
PURCHASE MONEY NOTE $1,600,000.
BASIS 2,000,000.
Less DEPRECIATION TO DATE 1,500,000.
ADJUSTED BASIS 500,000.
UNPAID BALANCE OF NOTE 1,200,000.
GAIN ON FORCLOSURE 700,000.
This payback of the tax savings occurs several years after the initial tax savings, which can
be invested during this interim. The time value of money, therefore, works for the investor.
21. § 465(c)(3)(A) supra note 2. Real Estate is specifically excluded for the purposes of
section 465. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1982).
22. I.R.C. § 465(a)(I) (West Supp. 1982).
23. Id.
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leveraging, borrowing on a non-recourse basis and then deducting
losses from a shelter valued much greater than the actual cash
investment.
24
A taxpayer is considered at-risk in an activity for other property or
cash contributed to him to the activity.25 Amounts borrowed with re-
spect to the activity to the extent that he is personally liable are also
included as at-risk.2'6 The at-risk amount will not, however, exceed the
fair market value of the taxpayer's interest in the secured property.27
Amounts borrowed at-risk do not include amounts borrowed from any
person who has an interest in the activity, other than as a creditor, or
amounts borrowed from a related person.28 Any amounts, even equity
capital contributed by the taxpayer, are not treated as at-risk if the
amounts are protected against loss through non-recourse financing,
guarantees, or other similar arrangements.29
The at-risk provisions deprive the negative pick-up of its attrac-
tiveness as investors now are strictly limited in their initial deductions.
In a negative pick-up the investor is not considered at risk beyond the
downpayment °
The most recent addition to the regulations defining the scope of
section 465, Temporary Regulations 5-1502-45, illustrates that the at-
risk rules preclude reasonable commercial endeavors. Under 5-1502-
45, corporations which are subsidiaries to other closely held corpora-
tions are limited to a deduction of the lesser of the amount the parent is
at risk in the subsidiary or the amount the subsidiary is at risk in the
specific activity. These newest regulations operate to deny losses on
consolidated returns where no tax sham is evident, even where real eco-
nomic risk is apparent.
32
As is often the case, subsidiary corporations are used to enter a
new area of business without exposing the parent companies' re-
sources. 33 Such a ploy has been accepted as sound business. As the
24. See Reisman and Taub, Benefits of Investing in Tax Shelters Remain Despite New
Restrictions Clamped on Them, 5 TAX'N FOR LAw. 196 (1977) (for a more thorough discus-
sion of the Act's impact on tax shelters generally).
25. I.R.C. § 465(b)(1) and (2) (West 1978).
26. Id.
27. § 465(b)(2)(B), supra.
28. I.R.C. § 465(d)(3)(A) (West 1978).
29. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (West 1978).
30. § 465(b)(1), supra.
31. Temp. Reg. 5.1502-4.5, T.D. 7685, adopted March 12, 1980.
32. See generally, Howard and Rosenberg, Temp. Regs. Bar Use ofSub to Skirt At-Risk'
Limits on Consolidated Returns, J. OF TAX'N, July 1980, at 6.
33. Id.
1982]
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regulations stand, however, the financial statement net worth of the
subsidiary is used to calculate the amount at-risk in a subsidiary. This
often substantially undervalues the fair market value, thereby foreclos-
ing economically sound ventures.
The purchase of a film was a desirable method of investing pro-
vided the individual investor looked first for a sound business deal, and
secondly for a tax shelter. The at-risk rules have limited such invest-
ments so that the risks normally outweigh the incentives except to the
larger movie studios.34
PART III: ALTERNATIVES TO AT-RISK
The Congress was divided as to which approach was best to curtail
abuses of tax shelters, and chose the at-risk method because of its sim-
plicity.35 Advancing the argument against the adoption of the at-risk
provisions were some who believed that tax shelters provide stimula-
tion to investors, resulting in economic growth and eventual tax reve-
nue increases.36 On the other end of the spectrum were those in the
House who proposed a limitation on artificial losses ("LAL") 37 which
would have disallowed offsetting gains in other activities, such as salary
with investment loss. 38 The Senate, however, rejected this proposal us-
ing the following logic:
From the economic standpoint, the problem with LAL was
that it failed to distinguish between the actual abuses of tax
shelters, cases where economically inefficient investments are
undertaken purely for tax reasons, and the situations where
tax incentives provide important encouragement to economi-
cally worthwhile investments. By disallowing deductions in
both cases, LAL would have eliminated many productive in-
vestments, a serious mistake at a time of high unemployment.
This problem would have been especially serious for the real
estate and oil and gas industries, since we are falling far short
of reaching our. . . goal of energy independence.
3 9
The same rationale applies to the film industry as motion pictures em-
34. See generally Weisner, Tax Shetlers-A Survey of the Impact of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 33 TAx. L. REV. 277 (1978).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 4 at 3353-3353.
36. Id.
37. Under LAL, Limitation on Artifical Losses, certain deductions such as accelerated
depreciation and intangible drilling cost would only be allowed against related income.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 2959-2963 (for a detailed explanation of this
proposal).
39. See S. REP. No. 938, supra note 4.
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ploy and involve a significant economic segment of the nation. °
A helpful approach to curtail abusive tax shelters is found in
Brountas v. CIR. ," where the Tax Court held that a nonrecourse note
was a key element of an oil drilling partnership and therefore was at-
risk. The court found that the note had economic substance, was indic-
ative of the fair market value of the property for which it was ex-
changed, and represented a necessary part of the overall business
42transaction. Because the case presented a factual setting predating
the Act and the at-risk provisions, the reasoning of Brountas represents
an alternative tool available to the Service to control tax shelter
abuses.43
As in Brountas, under drilling ventures an exploratory drilling
prospect is presented to the partnership by an operator with a geologi-
cal assessment. If the spot looks favorable, the drilling partnership
purchases the operator's agreement to drill. The operator is paid 40
percent of the price of the leasehold and drilling contract in cash. The
remaining balance is secured by a nonrecourse note payable to the op-
erator only through future production." Sometimes several drilling
sites are cross-collateralized, allowing the financing of one site to be
satisfied from the proceeds of a successful one.
The Brounlas court held that the nonrecourse notes which the in-
vestors gave to the operators had economic significance and were a
bona fide and bargained for part of the transactions.45
Where there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with eco-
nomic substance which is compelled or encouraged by busi-
ness or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and is not adapted solely by tax-avoidance
features that have meaningless labels attached, the Govern-
ment should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectu-
ated by the parties.'
In Brounlas the court examined the transactions by viewing them
as a total package and not by focusing solely on the nonrecourse
40. See generally, Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV.
567 (1965) (a theoretical discussion of what constitutes the proper criteria for motivating
income tax policy).
41. 73 T.C. 491 (1979).
42. Id.
43. The Act was not of "retroactive application." Gibson Products Co. v. U.S., 460 F.
Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978), qff'd 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
44. Brountas, supra at 567.
45. Id. at 540-541.
46. Bountas, supra at 539.
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notes.47 The note, though not strictly correllatable to the risks under-
taken by the operator, was viewed as, "an economically significant ad-
ditional piece in the package which compensated the operator" for the
obligations he undertook.48
As the court did in Brountas, the Service should recognize that
under these conditions a nonrecourse note is not a tax gimmick, but is
an economically sound way in which to structure a business agreement,
such as motion picture financing, that is heavily laden with risks.49
CONCLUSION
The total obliteration of all nonrecourse financing through the at-
risk rules is too inflexible an approach in industries burdened with
risks, such as oil exploration and film production. While the at-risk
provisions are convenient to apply, they are not cognizant of the eco-
nomic realities of the motion picture industry. To obtain the maximum
benefit for the economy of each investment, an investment decision
should be evaluated by the Service in its entirety.50
The Brounlas rationale provides the Service with the tools neces-
sary to make that evaluation by focusing on the fair market value of the
property being exchanged, 5 on the business motivation as opposed to
the tax incentives involved, 2 and upon whether the transaction repre-
sents "a reasonable range of commercial practice."53 As long as eco-
nomic substance and business purpose are found to exist, the at-risk
rules should not thwart legitimate business transactions.
When the Act was passed film-makers issued dire predictions that
film production would drop as much as fifteen percent. The primary
reason production revenues have not dropped in the unforeseen era of
the one-hundred million dollar "super-blockbuster," such as Jaws, Star
Wars and E.T. The volume of motion pictures now made by the major
studios is, however, small compared with the demands for product by
theaters. 4 The door to independent production companies can only be
47. Id. at 545.
48. Brountas, supra at 544.
49. See Shefsky, Take the Helter Out of Shelter, 58 TAXES 304 (1980).
50. Brountas, supra at 545.
51. See generally, Reg. § 1. 170A-1(c)(2) (defines fair market value in the context of a
charitable contribution in property).
52. See Shefsky, supra note 51 at 306.
53. Shefsky, supra note 51 at 304-304 ("Perhaps the key phrase that best summarizes the
court's reasoning in Brountas is 'a reasonable range of commercial practice.' ").
54. See Soon to be a Major Motion Picture, FORBES, March 19, 1979 45-49.
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opened by a flexible financing structure which minimizes the down-side
risks inherent in film production.
W Dennis A//red

